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OBSCENITY LAW IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Smith v. California
361 U.S. 147 (1959)
Plaintiff, proprietor of a bookstore, was convicted under a Los Angeles
City Ordinance' making it unlawful for a person to have in his possession
any obscene or indecent book in a place where books are offered for sale.
Plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court2 alleging that, inter
alia,3 construction of the ordinance as imposing a "strict" or "absolute"
criminal liability without requiring any element of scienter4 was in conflict
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction solely on the issue of
lack of scienter, basing its decision on the effect "strict" liability would
have on freedom of the press.5 A bookseller, acting at his peril, would have
to limit those books offered for sale to those about which he had knowledge.
The coercive force of "strict" liability toward encouraging self-imposed
restriction on free speech would be no less violative of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments than a direct legislative restriction imposed on con-
stitutionally protected matter.
Laws have existed in this country since 17126 attempting to regulate
obscenity. The enforcement of these laws, however, has not been uniform,7
1 Los Angeles, Cal., Code § 41.01.1.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1948).
3 Other Constitutional objections made by the Plaintiff were that evidence for the
defense as to the obscene character of a book was not permitted, although of a nature
constitutionally required to be admitted; that a constitutionally impermissible standard
of obscenity was applied by the trier of facts; and that the book was not in fact
obscene.
4 I.e., knowledge by the Plaintiff of the contents of the book.
5 Though the Ohio statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.34, requires knowledge and
thus escapes the infirmity, a random check of city ordinances reveals many subject to
attack for lack of a requirement of scienter. Akron, Ohio, Code C. 25 § 47 (1952);
Cincinnati, Ohio, Code § 90113 (1956); Cleveland, Ohio, Code § 13.1307 (1956); Co-
lumbus, Ohio, Code § 2343.02 (1952); Dayton, Ohio, Code § 947 (1954); Toledo, Ohio,
Code § 17-10-5 (1956).
In a recent Ohio case, State ex rel. King v. Shannon, 170 Ohio St. 393 (1960), the
suggestion was made that perhaps under the ruling of Cleveland v. Betts, 168 Ohio St.
386 (1958), municipalities do not have the power to enact ordinances in areas in
which the state has made the crime a felony, on the basis of the conffict clause, Art.
XVIII, Sec. 3, of the Ohio Constitution.
6 Acts & Laws of the Prov. of Mass., Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712).
7 Leary, Noall, "Entertainment: Public Pressures and the Law," 71 Harv. L. Rev.
326, 347 (1957). "Despite the sincerity and good intentions which often underlie the
actions of local officials, it must be recognized that their enforcement of the obscenity
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and has often been completely arbitrary and unreasonable. 8 Although the
Supreme Court had, by dicta, held obscenity to be outside the protection of
the constitution,9 it did not meet the issue squarely until 1957 in Roth v.
United States.10 The impact of the Smith case can most readily be seen by
viewing it in light of the Roth decision.
The Court, in the Roth decision, laid to rest the already defunct Hicklin
test" for obscenity and built anew from the "dominant" theme declared
by Justice L. Hand in the Ulysses case.' 2 The Court established a new test
for obscenity that is "bounded only by the definition of the term itself.' 13
This new test is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the matter taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interests."' 4
The Court has, by the scienter requirement, reduced the uncertainty ac-
companying the broad test in the Roth decision. This is not the first time the
Court has seized upon the requirement of knowledge to more narrowly
define a rule of law.'8 By coupling the requirement of knowledge with the
Roth test, the Court had rendered the test less susceptible to future attacks
for vagueness.' 6
It was argued in the Smith case that the scienter requirement would
hinder enforcement of obscenity laws because of the difficulty of proof.17
A more apparent effect would seem to be that enforcement efforts will be
laws is essentially extra-legal. These officials, largely unrestrained by the courts, exert
a far-reaching influence over the reading matter and entertainment available to the
community, and their determinations are in many respects even more secretive and
subjective than those of formal censorship boards."
8 Wiggins, "Freedom of Secrecy" (1956) at 194. "One local prosecutor used the
test of excluding everything he did not want his thirteen year old daughter to see.
Such highly subjective standards are commonly employed."
9 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
10 354 U.S. 476 (1956).
11 Queen v. Hicklin, L.R., 3 Q.B. 360 (1868) at 371. "I think the test of obscenity
is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands
a publication of this sort may fall."
12 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933),
aff'd, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) at 708. "(W)e believe that the proper test of whether
a given book is obscene is its dominant effect. In applying the test, relevancy of the
objectionable parts to the theme, the established reputation of the work in the estima-
tion of approved critics, if the book is modern, and the verdict of the past, if it is
ancient, are persuasive pieces of evidence; for works of art are not likely to sustain a
high position with no better warrant for their existence than their obscene content."
'3 Supra note 7, at 348.
14 Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 489.
15 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) at 103. "... [A] require-
ment of a specific intent ...made definite by decision or other rule of law saves the
Act from any charge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of vagueness."
16 Ibid.
'7 361 U.S. 147, at 154.
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directed towards those against whom evidence is most readily available, i.e.,
the "smut" dealer. He is the prime offender and should be the prime
target.'8 Little is to be gained by punishing the legitimate bookseller who
unknowingly offers an obscene publication for sale to the public. The end
result of such misquided prosecution can only be a breeding of disrespect
for the law and supression of the free exchange of ideas.
The present enforcement of obscenity laws is pervaded by extralegal
procedures of public officials19 and private organizations 20 which are en-
couraged by increasing public concern and uncertainty over the law. The
Court, by proclaiming a definite legal standard in the Roth and Smith deci-
sions, has taken a big step toward channeling enforcement back into the
hands of governmental enforcement agencies. This approach is necessary
to insure judicial review and its subsequent protection of individual rights.
Shelby V. Hutchins
Is "The vast bulk of the prosecutions under the obscenity laws are aimed at dealers
in so-called 'under-the-counter' pornography and 'stag' movies." Quoted from the
United States' brief in Roth v. United States, supra note 10, at 38.
19 Supra note 7, at 344-7.
20 Id. at 356-67.
